Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I apologize

for not being here. I was in Boston for the funeral of Kirk

O’Donnell earlier. And unfortunately I just got a little backed up.

And I apologize for that. But I am glad to be able to be here. And

I would like to just make a brief statement, if I can.

First of all, I thank you and I commend you for once again turning

the attention of this subcommittee to a timely hearing on North

Korea. We have had a number of hearings, probably more than in

other areas, as a subcommittee. And it underscores, I think, the

importance of our focus on what is happening there, or what we believe

to be happening there.

The Senate’s overwhelming vote last week on the McCain

amendment, which effectively cuts off funding for KEDO unless the

President certifies that North Korea is not actively pursuing a nuclear

capability, coupled with the adoption of the Hutchison amendment,

which extends the certification to cover sales of ballistic missiles

to terrorist countries—both of these steps by the Senate,

which we shared and took part in, reflect the growing concern in

Congress about North Korea’s behavior on the nuclear front.

In the last month alone, we have learned that North Korea is

building a secret underground complex, widely believed to be a nuclear

facility, and that it is continuing to upgrade its ballistic missile

capability, as evidenced by the launch of the previously referred

to three-stage TAEPO DONG I missile toward Japan. These

developments are obviously of huge concern to us, because they violate

the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agreed Framework, and they

raise very serious questions about North Korean intentions, as well

as serious questions about the effectiveness of the Agreed Framework

as the linchpin of our policy toward Pyongyang.

From its inception, let me underscore, the Agreed Framework

had a somewhat limited set of objectives. It covered only the reactor

at Yongbyon and related facilities, not every suspect site in

North Korea. Moreover, it did not compel the North to accept countrywide special IAEA inspections, those inspections obviously being

crucial to answering the question of whether or not the North had

been able to produce enough fissile material to make a nuclear

bomb. And it did that until several years after the agreement was

signed.

Despite this limited scope, however, the Agreed Framework has

produced some positive results: capping the ability of the North to

reprocess spent fuel with which to build nuclear weapons and vastly

improving our ability to monitor the North’s nuclear program—

and, I might add, at very minimal costs to the taxpayer. But it has

not accomplished its underlying strategic objective: namely, reducing

tensions on the Peninsula and creating an incentive for North

Korea to abandon altogether its nuclear ambitions.

So now, not unlike our choices with respect to Iraq, we have to

make a decision as to how to best advance the fundamental strategic

objective. Do we resuscitate the Agreed Framework, hoping that

the North will get back on track, or do we now take a different approach?

If we abandon the agreement, we obviously ought to do it with

a clearer understanding of what we may be losing in terms of capping

North Korea’s reprocessing of spent fuel and of intelligence gathering.

If, on the other hand, we come to the conclusion the

Agreed Framework, even with its limitations, is worth retaining, it

is critical that we and our allies, Japan and South Korea, follow

through on our obligations under that agreement.

In our case, that means ensuring the delivery of heavy fuel oil

for electric power generation; and, in the case of the South Koreans

and Japanese, funding the construction of light water reactors to

produce electricity by the year 2003. The North has already tried

to mask its own bad behavior by charging that our commitment to

the agreement is not serious, because deliveries of fuel oil have

been delayed.

And I remember the hearing we had here, where a number of us

underscored that it was vital to our foreign policy to be able to

guarantee that the North could not make that charge, that it could

not even have the privilege of suggesting that there was any rationale

that could be laid on our inactions or reluctance to fulfill

the agreement. And I think that comes home to roost to some degree

now. That is not an excuse, nor does that pardon them from

the accountability that we have to hold them to for their actions.

But we need to avoid this kind of situation in the future if the

Agreed Framework is to be sustained.

So I think we may be at a critical turning point in our policy toward

North Korea. And I apologize for missing the openings, but

I hope that our witnesses in the course of this hearing will shed

both value and light on the utility of that framework at this point

in time and what other options may be available to us if we conclude

that it is insufficient for achieving our objectives on the Korean

Peninsula.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Help me work through sort of the balance of the options that we

have. In your testimony you suggest, Mr. Kartman—you do not

suggest, let me just read it—you say point blank that what we seek

in our present dealings is to avoid a return to the circumstances

of 1993–1994, when tensions between North Korea, its neighbors,

the United States, and the international community were dangerously

high. We will continue to look for ways to reduce the tensions.

You then, prior to that, said: We also firmly believe that the

Agreed Framework must continue to be the centerpiece of U.S. policy

toward the DPRK for some time to come. Given the limitations

that I described in the Agreed Framework and the intentions that

Senator Thomas and others have obviously raised as a concern,

what do you have, if you have the Agreed Framework as the centerpiece

of our policy. We are delivering oil, our allies help build

a light reactor, but the North Koreans do not allow access to the

underground construction or other suspect sites, and the missile

program essentially continues, so that you have both the capacity

for a clandestine development of fissile material and the delivery

capacity going on side by side? How does that balance?

Why then not shift the focus, the centerpiece of

your policy? If the centerpiece of your policy continues something

that is so limited, don’t you need a new centerpiece?

No, I understand. I follow you. Then, as you go

through the talk process, when does the talk begin to be exhausted

and the prospect of a heavier hand come in, and what heavier hand

should be played? If you could lay out some options, I would appreciate

it.

Is there any critical time line for inspection by

which we must achieve access, in your judgment?

Can you state to us with respect to your policy

priorities where you put the issue of access and inspection of the

suspect sites?